

~~SECRET~~

NIC #0470-83

18 January 1982 **I**Further on My Monday Meeting with the "Dam Group" on Arms Control

The discussion which followed my presentation of several propositions on Soviet arms control compliance (a copy of which is attached) agreed with the propositions set forth. The remainder of the discussion centered on the following question posed by Dam.

Given the way the Soviets operate as described in the paper and given the high importance we have attached to verification from which we cannot realistically back off, shouldn't we strive for much more limited agreements than the kind we have been seeking?

The main example offered was cruise missiles. Several participants (Ikke and Perle especially) argued for their exclusion from agreements on the grounds that it was not possible to draft a verifiable agreement which would limit nuclear armed cruise missiles and the Soviets would inevitably have ample loopholes. A possible exception would be ALCMs on bombers because they are countable, but SLCMs present an impossible problem.

Admiral Howe resisted the notion that the scope of agreements should be much narrower because this would leave out important systems. This evoked the response that there were bound to be important uncovered systems anyway (e.g., short-range Soviet missiles that could cover Western Europe even if all SS-20s were eliminated) and besides, look what happens to us when we try to reach comprehensive agreements such as SALT.

/s/
Henry S. Rowen
Chairman

National Intelligence Council

Attachment



25X1

~~SECRET~~